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In 1966, the Supreme Court issued its monumental decision of
Miranda v. Arizona,2 requiring warnings of constitutional rights
as to counsel and self-incrimination prior to ,any custodial interroga-
tion or significant deprivation of freedom of action. While the initial
and substantial impact of this has already been felt throughout the
country, some of its more far-reaching implications-particularly in
the area of consent searches-may soon be coming to the forefront.
Although the designated thrust of Miranda is to safeguard and
protect the individual from unwarranted invasions of individual free-
dom as protected by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Consti-
tution, its additional importance lies in its implications for rights
secured by the Fourth Amendment, i.e., freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures. This is consistent with the Supreme Court's
historic view that "the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost
into each other"3 in so far as they protect the individual from the
power of the state.
Apart from its traditional exceptions of searches incidental to an
arrest and searches in "hot pursuit," the essential thrust of the
Fourth Amendment is to prohibit authorities of the state from search-
ing an individual's premises without a warrant based upon probable
cause. However, this right traditionally has been subject to waiver,'
which results in what is commonly called the consent search. It is
true that individuals who consent to warrantless searches often act
behind facades of feigned innocence or of blind confidence in their
B.A. St. Mary's College, J.D. University of Notre Dame, presently a member of the
Judge Advocate General's Corps, United States Army.
1. The opinions and conclusions presented herein are solely those of the author and
do not necessarily represent the views of The Judge Advocate General, the United
States Army, or any other governmental agency.
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
4. E.g., United States v. Perez, 242 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912
(1959).
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concealed niche. In spite of these occasional ploys, 5 courts have
been reluctant to approve of consent searches because of the high
possibility of coercion exerted by the police. In consent searches,
the sole issue is whether the person who consented did so voluntarily.
Heretofore, courts have not necessarily required knowledge of the
right to refuse as an essential element to a voluntary consent.6
In Miranda, the Supreme Court clarified previous amorphous
standards by mandating that the Fifth Amendment's "self-incrimi-
nation" clause required certain warnings as a prerequisite to any
interrogation in a custodial or significant-deprivation-of-freedom situ-
ation.7 Although the Court focused on the Fifth Amendment, the
underlying theory of the decision established a base upon which the
parallel rights of individuals in consent-search situations might also
be protected.8
In addition to the possibility that the words of consent them-
selves may constitute a communication and hence require the warn-
ings directly under the Miranda holding, the wider implication of that
holding is that a Miranda-type warning of the right to refuse the
request to search might also be a necessary prerequisite to a valid
consent search-under the theory that before a court can rule that
a person has waived his constitutional right, it ought first be assured
that he had knowledge of that right9 so that he could make an
intelligent waiver.10 Indeed, the realities of life underscore the
Miranda decision-the fact that too often one is ignorant of his
rights and the fact that too often one is intimidated by the inherent
pressure of the police."1 The same realities are applicable to the
consent search situation---, he fact that too often one is ignorant of
his rights and the fact that too often one is intimidated by the
policeman's request to search. This problem is compounded when
it is pointed out that the real victims of each of the situations
are not the professional criminal or the organized criminal. These
people are well aware of their rights. The real victims are the poor
and uneducated, or those who are confronted by the law for the first
time. All too often these people are engulfed by frightening visions
of what the police might do. Under these circumstances, the poor
and the uneducated often believe that they have no real choice but
to consent to the authorities' request to search their premises.
5. Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960).
6. E.g., United States v. Dornblut, 261 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
912 (1959).
7. Miranda v. Arizona, 884 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
8. Note, "Consent Searches: A Reappraisal After Miranda v. Arizona," 67 Co. L.
Etzv. 130 (1967).
9. See Johnson v. Zorbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
10. Quare whether anyone can intelligently waive a constitutional right such as those
discussed in this article.
11. of., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471-72 (1966).
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Given the Miranda decision, what is now needed is a requirement
which would insure that everyone-not just the organized and knowl-
edgeable criminals-is at least aware of his right to refuse to consent
to a search of his premises by the police. This logical extension of
Miranda is dictated both by the inherent coercive effect of a police
request and by the otherwise prejudicial effect of an unknowing and
unintelligent waiver of one's constitutional rights. Before Miranda,
an accused, ignorant of his rights 'to remain silent, often would un-
wittingly "talk about it" with the police; later, much to his preju-
dicial consternation, he would find out that not only did he have a
constitutional right to remain silent, but also that his utterances
would be used against him in court. The same problem attends the
consent search: an individual, uninformed of his right to refuse
a request to search, ignorantly consents to the police's request to
search his home; later, 'to his pernicious surprise, he discovers
that not only did he have a constitutional right to refuse the request
to search, but also, and more prejudicial, he discovers that those
items seized in that search will be used against him at trial.
When an individual consents to a search, he waives his Fourth
Amendment rights against unwarranted searches and seizures. Just
as the Supreme Court has ruled that an individual cannot waive his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel unless he was made aware of that
right,12 and just as that Court has held that an individual cannot
waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination unless he
was made aware of that right,13 so also is the implication clear that
an individual ought not be permitted to waive his Fourth Amendment
right to refuse a request to make a warrantless search unless it can
be certain that he was aware of that right.
At least one appellate court has recently approved this theory.
The Fifth Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, 14 held that knowledge
of the right to refuse was a prerequisite to a valid consent to
a search in Perkins v. Henderson.1 5 In Perkins, the evidence was
uncontroverted that the accused was not informed that he could
refuse the request to search.16 The petitioner also testified that
"he did not think there was much he could do about the search."'
'
The Court held:
12. Id. See also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). In the analogous line-up
situation, the California Supreme Court has ruled that the accused, in addition to having
the right to counsel, must be advised of that right. People v. Fowler, 1 Ca.3d 335, 345.
461 P.2d 643, 651, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363, 371 (1969). Cf. Rivers v. U.S., 400 F.2d 935, 940 (5th
Cir. 1968); U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967).
13. Miranda v. Arizona, 384, U.S. 436, 471-72 (1966).
14. It Is interesting to note that one of the three judges sitting on this case was G.
Harrold Carswell, the recent nominee to the United States Supreme Court, whose nomina-
tion was rejected by the United States Senate.
15. Perkins v. Henderson, 418 F.2d 441 (1969).
16. Id. at 442.
17. 1L4
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Consent may constitute a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights,
but, to be valid, a waiver must be an intelligent relinquish-
ment of a known right or privilege. A waiver cannot be valid
unless the person knows that his permission may be freely
and effectively withheld [citations omitted.] 8
Consistent with Miranda, the court agreed that one's constitutional
right to refuse a search request could be waived, but said that
it must be a knowing and intelligent waiver. It follows, of course,
from Miranda, that one who consents cannot be presumed to know
of his right to refuse; he must first be advised of his right to refuse
the request to search.
The path for the future undoubtedly will be a pronouncement by
the Supreme Court which will provide a uniform rule in order to
determine the constitutional validity of consent searches. To avoid
ambiguity as to what constitutes a sufficient apprisal of this right,
it is important that the required advice be defined. In formulating
a particular type of warning, it is important to prevent a token,
ritualistic warning which would provide no meaningful concept to
the uneducated individual.
What is essentially required by Miranda and its logical extension,
as developed herein, is that a minimum of education of the existence
of the constitutional right be provided prior to any consent to search.
Equally important is the need for a minimal education of the indi-
vidual to apprise him of the consequences of a waiver of that
right. Only with these safeguards built into the warning can it fairly
be presumed that the individual has made a "knowing and intel-
ligent" waiver. With these principles in mind, it is clear that any
required warning prior to a consent search ought to include the
following elements: (1) We desire to search your house without a
search warrant and ask your consent; (2) You have a constitutional
right to refuse our request to do so; (3) You can require us to secure
a search warrant; (4) Any evidence seized in your premises can
be used against you in a court of law; (5) You have a right to
have present an attorney, either retained or appointed. 9
It is doubtful that this requirement would impose an oppressive
burden upon the police. The incremental duty would be a short,
intelligent recital of these rights to the individual. If after this, the
individual consents, the authorities have a knowing and intelligent
waiver, and they can proceed to conduct a valid consent search.
18. Id.
19. The lawyer's presence would insure that any waiver was made knowingly and in-
telligently. Moreover, his presence would significantly reduce the possibility of subtle Co-
ercion by the police, as well as constituting a limiting factor as to any unconsented ex-
pansion of the scope of the search. An argument can be made that this last element is
especially needed when the person from whom the consent is sought is a suspect in a
crime, under the theory that the search and items found therein will almost certainly
provide for some opportunity, albeit subtly perhaps, for custodial interrogation.
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On the other hand, if the individual refuses, the authorities cannot
legitimately complain because an individual has exercised his con-
stitutional right. If the authorities have probable cause to believe
that incriminating evidence is contained on the individual's premises,
they can, of course, proceed to the magistrate and obtain a valid
search warrant. Under these conditions, an equitable balance is as-
sured between the individual's rights to privacy and the state's
power of criminal prosecution.
The necessary result of the development of a required warning
would not decrease the effectiveness of justice. Instead, it would
merely extend to the poor and the uneducated the rights which the
wealthy presume and which the organized criminal sometimes flaunts.
Effecting this logical extension is the only method which would
equate the real rights of the poor and oppressed to the rights of the
rest of society. Finally, it would end the discrimination against the
poor and uneducated, who are otherwise more susceptible to the
subtle pressures for a consent search.

